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Freedom has appeared in the world at different times and under various
forms; it has not been exclusively bound to any social condition, and it is
not confined to democracies. Freedom cannot, therefore, form the
distinguishing characteristic of democratic ages. The peculiar and
preponderating fact which marks those ages as its own is the equality of
conditions; the ruling passion of men in those periods is the love of this
equality.
— Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835

Introduction
In recent decades, industry has come under criticism for failing to cover the environmental costs
of doing businesses. When companies are allowed to pollute, or to use natural resources
without paying their full price, they are in effect appropriating natural capital – land, air, and
water – without compensation to society at large.
Economists have paid a good deal of attention to the inefficiencies that result when companies
pass on, or “externalize,” production costs in the form of environmental damage. But few have
looked at the broader effects of externalities on public welfare, particularly on the distribution of
wealth. The research summarized in this chapter suggests that externalities are an important
force behind economic inequality and poverty in the United States. Some degree of inequality is
to be expected in any society. But massive disparities are unacceptable in a culture that upholds
the principle that all people are created equal – and all the more intolerable when fueled by the
seizure of common public assets.
The impetus for the research presented here comes from the four years I spent as Secretary of
the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) for the state of Louisiana. I was a scientist at
Louisiana State University (LSU) in 1987 when Buddy Roemer, a reform-minded candidate,
was elected governor. (Roemer was trained at Harvard, but when asked about it he usually
replied, “Don’t hold that against me.”) After his election, Roemer advertised in the Wall Street
Journal for positions in his cabinet, an unconventional approach in a state known for political
patronage. I had hosted the first Earth Day at LSU in 1970, and had led the development of the
state’s coastal management program. I had never met the governor, but I liked what I had heard
him say about pollution. Having complained for years about environmental destruction in
Louisiana, I thought it was time to “put up or shut up.” So I applied, along with a couple
hundred others, to be environmental secretary. I got the job.
During my tenure, the DEQ expanded its capacity, helped to draft new laws, drew up new
regulations, and stepped up enforcement. With nearly every move to tighten up on pollution
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control, we heard from industry and economists on corporate payrolls that we would run jobs
out of the state. That assertion didn’t make a lot of sense to me, since at the time Louisiana had
neither adequate jobs nor a clean environment. The state’s unemployment rate was 12 percent
in 1987, the highest in the country. The state also led the nation in toxic discharges, according to
the first Toxic Release Inventory issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
1989. It seemed to me that environmental protection would foster jobs rather than diminish
them, that a clean environment would be good for people and for the economy. But I needed
hard data and analysis to back up this hypothesis.
By the end of my four-year term, amidst much controversy, we had cut the state’s toxic
discharges in half. We implemented new regulations and passed new laws, including an Air
Toxics Law enacted a year before the 1990 Federal Clean Air Act Amendments. At the same
time, enforcement went up by a factor of five. We began to condition industrial property tax
exemptions on environmental criteria (Templet & Farber 1994, Farber et al. 1995). Contrary
to the warnings from industry, investment and jobs in Louisiana rose as pollution declined
(Figure 1). Many jobs were generated by a six-fold increase in

Figure 1: Louisiana Pollution Abatement Capital Outlay and Manufacturing Jobs
190

1000

Capital Outlay for
Abatement
Jobs
(000)

185

180

800
175

170

600

165
400

160

Louisiana Manufacturing Jobs (thousands)

Industrial Capital Outlay for Pollution Control (millions $)

1200

200
155

0
1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

150
1996

Year

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book ; US Department of
Commerce, Current Industrial Reports, Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures; US. Department of
Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Annual Survey of Manufactures, Statistics for Industry
Groups and Industries 1989.

3

spending on industrial pollution control. Other socioeconomic indicators also began to improve
(Templet 1995c). When I returned to the university in 1992, I began systematic research on
these issues.1
Externalities As Subsidies
All economies depend fundamentally on nature. The environment provides the economy with
natural resources needed to produce goods and services, and provides a place for wastes from
production and consumption to go (see Figure 2). A diminished environmental base threatens
economic welfare. If, for example, industry discharges more waste than the environment can
assimilate, toxins accumulate in fish and wildlife, and threaten commercial and sport fishing. Acid
rain and air pollution damage crops and trees, retarding agriculture and forestry. On the other
hand, cities and regions that maintain clean air and aesthetic appeal are more likely to attract
business and tourism. If ground and surface water are kept relatively clean, then minimal treatment
is needed for human consumption, so the public spends less. And conservation leaves more
resources available for future generations.
Figure 2: The Relationship of the Economy to the Environment
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The environment can be viewed as infrastructure, contributing to the economy in a similar fashion
as man-made systems for water delivery and waste disposal. Just as the public welfare suffers
when our built infrastructure is poorly maintained, so we suffer when the environment is abused.
Those who pollute without paying the costs are depreciating capital that belongs to society at large.
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But while society normally penalizes those who steal or embezzle public financial capital, we
persist in allowing the unauthorized appropriation of public natural capital, despite the fact that
natural capital is arguably more valuable to humankind than the entire stock of man-made capital
(Costanza et al. 1997).
When producers externalize costs, they reap a subsidy. A firm releasing toxins to the
environment, for example, is spared the expense of controlling that pollution, instead
appropriating natural capital from the sink side. The result of this implicit subsidy is greater
corporate profit, while those on the receiving end are burdened with pollution, health problems,
and diminished quality of life. The result is a redistribution of wealth that tends to exacerbate
socio-economic inequalities.
Producers also receive subsidies in the form of preferential energy prices and favorable tax
rates. In these instances, the public pays the cost directly. One way in which vested interests
manage to create subsidies for themselves is through political clout. The more that members of
Congress receive in campaign contributions, for example, the more they tend to vote in favor of
industry and against environmental protection; the poorer a Congress person’s voting record on
the environment, the more subsidies his or her state tends to grant to industry (Templet 1995a).
Subsidies foster inequality in three ways. First, they diminish productivity, disposable incomes,
health, and quality of life of those who bear their cost. Second, subsidies help the recipients to
bolster their political power, which they can use to manipulate both government policies and
markets to their advantage. Third, subsidies deprive the government of revenues which it might
otherwise use for education, health care, and other programs that serve citizens. In the research
presented here I examine only the first two effects, leaving aside fiscal impacts. I do so by
exploring the correlations between subsidy measures and environmental and socioeconomic
indicators in the 50 states. The aim is to document how externalities contribute to inequality and
poverty, and to consider how the public can re-appropriate natural capital.
Measuring Subsidies
Absolute subsidies are difficult to measure, since they can be calculated only by comparison to a
hypothetical, subsidy-free world. Instead of attempting this, I calculate each of the three
subsidies discussed below relative to the U.S. average. Those states paying below average
subsidies are still paying subsidies, but their value is negative relative to the mean. If states with
lower subsidies can be shown to have higher public welfare, then one can infer that a reduction
in subsidies would benefit welfare in all states, and that those states with the biggest subsidies
have the most to gain.
The pollution subsidy
State laws and regulations generally require that industry internalize pollution costs to some
degree (Templet 1993). While there are also federal laws to regulate emissions, states have
5

considerable latitude in administering them. For both reasons, spending on pollution control
varies considerably from one state to another.2
For the purposes of this study, I define the pollution subsidy as the degree to which a state falls
short of the nationwide average on spending to control pollution. Of course, states with more
industries using toxic chemicals should spend more on pollution control. The pollution subsidy is
therefore specified as the costs that manufacturers avoid by spending less than the national
average per pound of toxic pollution times total pounds released in a state.
I use data on spending on pollution control from the Current Industrial Reports of the U.S.
Census Bureau (1992). Regrettably, the Census Bureau no longer collects this information,
because after the Republican Party gained a majority in Congress in 1994, lawmakers cut the
Bureau’s budget and eliminated this function. The data on pounds of toxic releases are drawn
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (1991) Toxics Release Inventory. For interstate comparisons, I then calculate the pollution subsidy, based on these data, in dollars per
capita. The results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Relative Subsidies in the Fifty States ($ per capita)
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
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Pollution subsidy Energy subsidy
59
103
192
218
98
57
48
43
-48
-100
-51
-104
-38
-315
-243
6
17
175
-26
-11
-22
10
2
-27
-22
-180
32
40
30
-43
172
-90
-42
-171
410
183
-103
-119
-47
-41
-12
-427
-11
-335
10
-231
170
85
11
-85
283
-121
46
-95

Tax subsidy
196
-396
155
129
-51
2
39
-242
232
38
257
21
35
29
-105
-14
45
286
-26
-142
-301
-207
-114
156
113
-260
-63

Total subsidy
357
13
310
220
-200
-153
-313
-479
424
1
244
-5
-167
101
-117
68
-169
879
-248
-230
-740
-553
-336
410
39
-98
-112

State
Pollution subsidy Energy subsidy
Tax subsidy
Total subsidy
Nevada
7
-111
450
346
New Hampshire
-7
-515
-240
-762
New Jersey
-77
-222
-126
-426
New Mexico
65
-75
283
274
New York
-27
-121
-253
-401
North Carolina
28
12
-3
36
North Dakota
7
53
58
118
Ohio
-17
-102
-31
-149
Oklahoma
29
107
126
262
Oregon
-16
-57
-404
-477
Pennsylvania
-38
-44
-40
-122
Rhode Island
-43
-201
-98
-342
South Carolina
-5
83
63
140
South Dakota
13
-66
127
73
Tennessee
174
-59
309
424
Texas
14
159
142
315
Utah
411
-11
42
441
Vermont
-16
-326
-123
-465
Virginia
30
80
-41
69
Washington
-39
-49
442
354
West Virginia
3
67
172
243
Wisconsin
-44
-155
-140
-339
Wyoming
102
-107
-115
-120
Note: Figures for subsidies represent spending relative to the nationwide average (see text).

The energy subsidy
To varying degrees in different states, residents pay more for energy than industry. In effect,
consumers subsidize industry. If the price differential is great, residents may not be able to afford
enough fuel themselves, or they may have to forego other wants.
To measure the energy subsidy to industry, I collected data on energy expenditures by the
industrial sector in each state, from the US Energy Information Agency, and on the ratio of
residential to industrial prices. On average across the United States, residents pay
approximately twice what industry pays for an equal amount of energy. Some level of disparity
can be justified on the basis that firms consume in larger volumes, and thus the cost of delivering
energy to a firm is cheaper than delivering the same amount to multiple households. But price
differentials vary widely, with the ratio of residential to industrial prices ranging from 1.01 in
New Hampshire and Massachusetts to 4.0 in Alaska. The energy subsidy is defined here as
how much more the industrial sector in each state would spend if the residential-to-industrial
price ratio were equal to the U.S. average. Again, the subsidy is normalized by the state’s
population.3 The results are presented in the second column of Table 1.
The tax subsidy
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Most states rely on a mix of sales, income, and property taxes to generate public revenues.
Some of these methods are more progressive than others in their distributional impacts. In
general, income and property taxes tend to be progressive; that is, they take a larger share of
income from the rich than from the poor. Sales taxes, by contrast, take a fixed share of the
amount consumed. Since those with low and modest incomes generally spend a higher share of
their income on consumption than do the rich, sales taxes tend to be regressive.
To obtain a measure of the tax subsidy to business, I calculated for each state the ratio of
regressive taxes collected to progressive taxes collected – considering property and income
taxes to be progressive, and sales taxes to be regressive – and compared that ratio to the U.S.
average. A state that relies more heavily than average on regressive taxes is considered to
provide a subsidy to those with high incomes and large property holdings, a subsidy paid for by
those with low incomes and little property. I then divide the total dollar value of this subsidy by
state population. 4 (These results are reported in the third column of Table 1.)
The total subsidy
The total state subsidy per capita is the sum of the pollution, energy, and tax subsidies per
capita. The totals are presented in the final column of Table 1 and depicted in Figure 3. In
general, the states with relatively high subsidies tend to be in the South and to a lesser extent the
West. The Northeast and Midwest tend to grant fewer subsidies.
In addition to pollution, energy and tax subsidies, many southern states also are liberal in
granting direct subsidies expressly designed to attract industry. The South and West have been
later to industrialize than other regions, and this may help to explain their greater tendency to
allow industry to externalize costs more, much as developing countries often do (Templet
1996). Yet Freudenberg (1990) finds that “there is evidence that the communities gaining the
most from industrial development are the ones that have spent the least to attract it.”
The Fruits of Subsidies
Having calculated these subsidies, I examined their relationships to various measures of
environmental and economic performance. To relate these to subsidies, I estimated statistical
correlation coefficients of variation across the 50 states by means of simple linear regressions.
This section highlights the key results.
Subsidies and environmental performance
To examine the relationships between subsidies and environmental performance, I used the
state-level measures of environmental policy and environmental quality, developed by the
Institute for Southern Studies (Hall and Kerr 1991). The Green Policy index incorporates 77
indicators, such as the existence of state policies on recycling, toxic waste management, and air
8
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Conditions index is based on 179 other indicators, including measures of air and water pollution
and toxic chemical releases. In both cases, the higher the score, the poorer the state’s
environmental status.
Not surprisingly, the correlation between the pollution subsidy and the Green Policy Index was
significant and positive (r=0.52): the higher the pollution subsidy, the lower the state ranked in
the strictness of its environmental standards and enforcement. The energy subsidy is also
significantly and positively related to the Green Conditions index (r=0.47) and Green Policy
index (r=0.52), indicating that as the energy subsidy increases, environmental protection grows
weaker. The tax subsidy, too, is associated with worse environmental performance; its
correlation with the Green Index (a combination of the quality and policy indices) is significant
and positive (r=0.44).
Subsidies and economic performance
The pollution subsidy is correlated with worse economic performance in terms of poverty,
income disparity, unemployment, and average personal income. These findings run counter to
the claim that the benefits and costs of pollution control are regressive, with the costs falling
disproportionately on the poor while benefits accrue elsewhere (Baumol and Oates 1988).
Instead, as firms externalize more costs, poverty and income disparity increase, and incomes
decline. This suggests that spending to control pollution constitutes a progressive policy in terms
of income distribution. The benefits may be more than just economic, since it is the poor, and
often minorities, who are most likely to live near polluting facilities.5
The energy subsidy displays similar correlations: it is significantly and positively related to
poverty (r=0.46), unemployment (r=0.51), and income disparity (r=0.49), and negatively
related to personal income (r=-0.45). The tax subsidy, too, is related significantly and negatively
to personal income (r=-0.39), and positively to income disparity (r=0.31) and poverty (r=0.42).
Because the tax subsidy is regressive, drawing from the poor and middle class and benefiting the
wealthy, it is no surprise that higher tax subsidies lead to more poverty and to wider income
disparity.
I also examined the relationship between the pollution subsidy and job growth in the late 1980s,
and found the correlation to be significant and negative (r=-0.41), indicating that as firms avoid
the costs of pollution control, the state foregoes jobs. This finding is consistent with Louisiana’s
experience in 1988 to 1992 under the Roemer administration, when manufacturers increased
spending on pollution control by 600 percent, toxic releases dropped by more than 50 percent,
and manufacturing jobs in the state grew by 20,000. As Figure 1 shows, manufacturing jobs in
Louisiana had been declining prior to 1988, and after 1992, when pollution spending began to
decline again under a new administration, manufacturing jobs fell once again.6
In the realm of profits, on the other hand, one would expect that subsidies would have a positive
effect. Data on corporate profits are not available by state, but we can use a surrogate measure
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– value added in manufacturing – to test whether profits increase when the pollution subsidy
rises.7 Value added is normalized by the number of manufacturing jobs to adjust for sector size
across states. I found that value added per job is indeed significantly and positively related to
the pollution subsidy, suggesting that corporate profits rise when pollution control costs are
avoided. Louisiana, for example, leads the nation in value added per manufacturing job, at
nearly double the national average. It also leads the nation in toxic pollution per job, at more
than ten times the natural average.8 The energy subsidy likewise shows a significantly positive
relationship with value added per job in manufacturing.
If firms were to invest these added profits within the state, then they might contribute to public
welfare through increased employment and income. In that case, some of their de facto
appropriation of natural capital might be justified. In fact, however, most of the profits go to
shareholders and managers, who often reside in other states. In general, profits tend to leak
from high-subsidy, low-income states to low-subsidy, high-income states, fueling inter-state
inequality. I return to this issue below.
Making Connections
As pollution, energy, and tax subsidies rise, poverty and income disparity increase. Profits rise
but leak out of the state, reducing income. Unemployment rises, also reducing income. Natural
capital is depleted and toxic emissions rise. The connections extend further. Poorer
environmental quality is associated with worse public health (Boyce et al. 1999); and increased
morbidity, mortality, and health care costs represent a further drag on the economy. At the same
time, disparities of income within and between states foster the concentration of political power
in fewer hands. A vicious cycle ensures, whereby more concentrated power leads to more
subsidies, which again lead to more poverty, inequity, and concentrated power. Figure 4 depicts
some of these rather complex inter-connections.
Figure 4: Subsidies, Poverty and the Government
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Subsidies and political power
A troubling correlate of high subsidies is low voting rates. An active voting public is critical to a
democratic society, and is one indicator of the extent of social capital. Among states with
above-average total subsidies, participation in federal elections is on average 15 percent lower
than the U.S. average. Citizens in high-subsidy states may well feel disenfranchised, perceiving
that their elected representatives cater to special interests. They may doubt that voting will
change anything. Yet low participation itself contributes to the further concentration of power.
Those receiving subsidies can use additional financial capital in a number of ways. One obvious
way is to spend more on campaign contributions, and to hire more lobbyists to protect and
augment the subsidies. Industrial corporations are major contributors to political campaigns. In
making contributions, special interests not only help to elect representatives who serve their
interests, but may also influence choices for appointed positions.
In my experience as a cabinet official in Louisiana’s state government, I found that the quality of
public leadership declines as special interests increase their sway. Even federally funded
programs tend to languish. State agencies become less responsive to citizens, who in turn
withdraw from the political process. The state becomes a less attractive place to live and do
business. The end result is institutional failure, the erosion of democracy and the loss of social
capital.
Again and again, decision makers hear the refrain that higher environmental standards will drive
away firms and jobs and lower welfare. Yet much empirical research supports my own findings
to the contrary. For example, Meyer (1992) found that worker productivity, employment, and
growth rates are lower in states with poorer environmental rankings. Cannon (1993) likewise
found that economic growth rates were lower in states with poorer environmental records. The
fact that environmental protection and economic welfare go hand in hand must be impressed
upon public officials.
Leakage
Large companies are the biggest beneficiaries of subsidies; they use the most energy and other
resources, discharge the most waste, and have the largest incomes and property holdings. If all
of the profits generated by subsidies were to remain in the state, the recycling of the extra
income might counter at least some of the harm that subsidies inflict on public welfare. Many of
the profits are exported, however, to shareholders and managers living in other states. In fact,
value added per job – the surrogate measure for profits – is positively and significantly related to
the share of gross state product that leaves the state. The greater the subsidies, the greater the
profits, and the greater the rate of leakage.
Louisiana again offers a case in point. It has the highest subsidies in the country, as well as the
highest value added per manufacturing job. Yet only two-thirds of the annual gross state
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product accrues as income within the state (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997). The remainder,
roughly $5,000 per person annually, is exported to other states, or even to other countries since
some of the firms are foreign-owned. If Louisiana were instead to retain this profit, the state’s
per-capita income would be close to the U.S. average.
Leakage is a major source of income disparities among states. It drains income from states that
use the most resources and generate the most pollution, relying heavily on such industries as
mining, manufacturing, and logging. These states tend to be poorer than average. The profits
leak to richer states, which tend to pay smaller subsidies and to export less income. As leakage
declines, income rises; as income declines, leakage rises. A number of the richer states import
net income; that is, their total income exceeds their state product.
As income leaks from a state, we see rises in unemployment, poverty, and pollution. The
situation is analogous to colonialism, in which the mother country draws resources and other
wealth from the colony, proffering little compensation in return. In this respect, the United States
displays a kind of internal colonialism.
Policy Recommendations
Society can improve both public welfare and environmental quality by cutting subsidies and by
taking back the commons, so as to restore natural capital to citizens. Campaign finance reform
is critical to electing officials who will work for change, in the face of opposition from the
entrenched interests who will try to defend the status quo.
Cutting subsidies
The pollution subsidy is a sink subsidy: it is based on cost-free access to the pollution-absorbing
capacity of the environment. We need laws, regulations and enforcement to minimize industrial
discharges, and to re-appropriate this national asset. Economic incentives can be useful, in
particular to reach goals beyond minimal thresholds, but they are not sufficient by themselves.
State inspections of facilities, for example, have been found to have more impact on
environmental performance than incentives (Dasgupta et al. 1999).
One way to give firms a greater incentive to reduce pollution is to award tax exemptions based
on environmental performance. In Louisiana, we devised an Environmental Scorecard to rate
firms, and conditioned a firm’s property tax exemption on its annual score.9 The rating was
based on level of toxic discharges per job, and on compliance with environmental regulations,
i.e. how many penalties a firm had incurred over a designated time period. Firms could also
apply for bonus points, for example, by submitting a waste reduction plan or locating in areas
needing development. Depending on its score, a firm could receive 50 to 100 percent of the
requested exemption. Each percentage point could mean hundreds of thousand of dollars, so
the incentive to perform well was substantial. Unfortunately, industry opposed the incentive
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vociferously, and after Buddy Roemer was defeated for a second term, the new governor’s first
official act was to eliminate the Scorecard.
The energy subsidy is a source subsidy: it reduces the cost of obtaining a natural resource.
There is no particular reason that industry should enjoy drastically cheaper energy than the
public does. Some discount for volume may be justified, but economies of scale do not explain
why residents pay four times as much as industry in Louisiana and Alaska, while the average
U.S. resident pays only twice the industrial price. The huge price differences in certain states
reflect political power. Eliminating the energy subsidy would return the appropriated natural
assets to citizens in the form of reduced pollution and more equitable prices. It would also
promote more efficient use of energy, and enhance public health. Citizens could spend less on
energy, and more on education or other needs.
One way to gauge a “fair” price for energy is to use the nationwide average ratio of residential
to industrial prices as a standard. Cutting above-average subsidies would not internalize all
costs, but it would be a step in that direction. Energy prices that reflected all costs, including the
associated security and environmental costs, would be much higher than current U.S. prices,
and nearer to those of Europe. Higher prices for industrial energy would encourage greater
efficiency in U.S. industry, which is currently among the least energy-efficient of industrialized
countries. Nationally, empirical data show a significant and positive relationship (r=0.67)
between industrial energy prices and economic growth (Templet 1999).
In the area of taxation, a shift from regressive sales taxes to taxes on resource use and waste
releases would create stronger incentives to conserve resources and to reduce pollution. 10
Environmental taxes would require payment for the privilege of using natural capital as source or
sink. Citizens who use less would benefit from lower taxes, less pollution, and conservation.
Pollution-related health spending would also decline.
The distribution of income, property and sales taxes could also be adjusted to establish a
reasonable ratio of regressive to progressive taxes. Again, the U.S. average ratio might serve as
a standard. States with above-average tax subsidies could reduce their sales taxes and
correspondingly raise income and/or property taxes, in addition to raising revenues from source
and sink taxes.
Campaign finance reform
All of these reforms will be difficult to enact. Entrenched interests that benefit from current
subsidies will use their political power to fight change. Hence the need for campaign finance
reform. The correlation among the size of campaign contributions, Congressional environmental
voting records and state subsidies to industry do not establish a conclusive case, but they
suggest that campaign contributions help to promote subsidies for vested interests. Campaign
finance reform is essential to curb the purchase of influence through campaign contributions, and
to make room for progressive environmental policies.
15

Conclusion
When firms externalize environmental costs, they appropriate de facto property rights to natural
capital. They capture subsidies, and the public pays the price. These firms often use political
clout to advance their interests. The resulting state policies tend to make the state less attractive
to other firms, reducing the diversity of businesses (Templet 1996). Communities may be left
with a “company town” syndrome. They grow poorer, more polluted, more subject to boomand-bust cycles, and more dependent on the industries that are reaping the benefits. As
concentrated wealth fosters concentrated power, public policy embraces subsidies even more.
The result is a spiral of public and ultimately private decline. Although corporations can
eventually pick up and go elsewhere, the public as a whole cannot.
This negative scenario can be averted by requiring businesses to internalize their costs. We can
reduce or eliminate pollution, energy, and tax subsidies in favor of a more equitable system. We
can shift to progressive taxes and to taxes on the things we want to avoid – excessive resource
use and pollution. A tax on resource use will promote conservation and improvements in
efficiency. A tax on waste releases will encourage firms to pollute less, improving efficiency,
health, and quality of life. By reallocating natural capital to the public domain, we can both
protect the environment, reduce poverty, and improve quality. As Alexis de Tocqueville pointed
out 166 years ago, equality is a defining characteristic of American democratic society.
Environmental abuse is bad not only for our health, but also for our democratic ideals.
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Endnotes

1

In 1991, Buddy Roemer lost his bid for a second term as governor, in the face of much softmoney spending by industry to defeat him. Some of our reforms were rolled back by the next
two governors, but others remained in place.
2

The effectiveness of state policy depends not only on laws and regulations but also on
enforcement. In Louisiana, for example, the state imposed only 25 percent as many penalties in
1997 as it did per year when Governor Roemer was in office from 1988 to 1992. The size of
the penalties also dropped, with the dollar amount of fines in 1997 less than 10 percent of the
1989 level. Not surprisingly, pollution in Louisiana is increasing again: lax enforcement means
greater subsidies.
3

For details regarding these calculations, see Templet (1995b).

4

For details, see Templet (1995b). As would be expected, the tax subsidy per capita is
significantly and negatively correlated with the “tax fairness” score constructed by the
Corporation for Enterprise Development (1995), a non-profit research and policy organization
which monitors economic development in the 50 states.
5

See Chavis and Lee (1987), Bullard (1990), Pastor (2001), and Bouwes et al. (2001).

6

The contribution of pollution-control spending to jobs is even more impressive when directly
compared to other state schemes to promote employment. A study by Management Information
Services (American Chemical Society 1993) found that every additional million dollars spent on
pollution control creates 22 jobs in the pollution control sector alone (not counting any multiplier
effects on employment in other sectors). By contrast, Louisiana has had little success with tax
incentives aimed expressly to create jobs: Louisiana has lost about 15,000 manufacturing jobs
since 1980, while paying out over $5 billion in tax subsidies.
7

Value added is the value of shipments minus the cost of raw materials. Subtracting other
production costs from value added would yield profits.
8

In 1990, Louisiana’s Toxics Release Inventory emissions per job in the emitting sector
amounted to 2,496 pounds, compared to a US average of 188 pounds (Templet 1995a).
9

For details, see Templet et al. (1991), Templet and Farber (1994), and Farber et al. (1995).

10

For reviews of tax shifting experience in other countries, see Roodman (1999) and Ekins
(1999).
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